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Introduction
This paper studies the implications of …nancial market imperfections for the design of monetary policy rules in a standard New Keynesian economy. Currently, Canada follows an in ‡ation targeting (IT) rule, but there is much interest in the advantages and disadvantages of moving to a price-level-path targeting (PT) regime. The conventional wisdom (e.g., Duguay (1994) ) about price-level targeting is that it o¤ers lower longterm variability in the price level at the cost of higher short-term variation in in ‡ation and output. Recently, several papers have challenged this conventional view (Svensson (1999) , Vestin (2006) ). In particular, Vestin (2006) shows that PT dominates IT when agents are forward-looking. Under a PT regime these agents would set prices taking into consideration that higher-than-expected in ‡ation will be followed by lower-thanexpected in ‡ation. Thus under this new view, PT can be a free lunch, that is, PT can deliver both lower long-term and short-term variability in in ‡ation. This paper compares these two regimes in a forward-looking model augmented with …nancial market imperfections in the presence of nominal debt contracts.
1 First, we show that in general PT can deliver lower long-run and short-run variability in in ‡ation. This con…rms the new view in the literature. Second, we compare PT versus IT based on a loss function including both variability in in ‡ation and the output gap. 2 We show that stabilizing in ‡ation does not necessarily imply a stabilization of the output gap in the presence of …nancial market frictions. Although PT outperforms the current IT regime in general, the gain is lower when …nancial market imperfections are present. Output gap throughout the paper refers to the deviation of output from the e¢ cient level which would prevail in a ‡exible-price economy. 3 We use the deviation from the e¢ cient output level rather than the steady-state level because in the presence of technology shocks, the e¢ cient level of output varies. It is natural to allow the central bank to recognize this fact when adjusting nominal interest rates.
Our model features sticky prices, money-in-the-utility function, investment adjustment costs, …nancial market imperfections, and imperfect competition in the producers of …nal goods. We expand the degree of …nancial market imperfections in Bernanke et al. (1999) . In particular, we assume: (1) entrepreneurs only have access to nominal debt contracts, 4 and (2) capital producers are …nanced with equity and subject to equity issuance costs. We expect that assuming one-period debt contracts to be written in nominal terms will generate an additional distortion due to unanticipated changes in the price level (debt-de ‡ation e¤ect). Unexpected changes in the price level have an impact on the real value of …rms'liabilities and change the balance sheet conditions of …rms. This has an e¤ect on the external …nance premium, and in turn, on the response of the real economic activity to shocks (…nancial accelerator mechanism). Meh et al. (2008) has shown that in the presence of nominal assets, a price-level shock can create redistributions among agents and the extent of redistributions is di¤erent under PT than IT. However, their study has not taken into account di¤erent sources of business cycle ‡uctuations and …nancial market imperfections. The assumption that capital producers are …nanced with equity is motivated by the fact that …rms frequently issue equity and that equity …nance does have an important role in …rm …nancing. 5 We capture the imperfections in the equity market by assuming capital producers face a friction in obtaining equity …nance. This friction is characterized by a quadratic function that relates the cost of issuing equity to the amount of equity raised. We also assume that this cost is countercyclical.
We estimate the main structural parameters of the model using Canadian time series. Taking the estimates as the parameters in our benchmark case, we compare the estimated IT with PT by performing stochastic simulations of the model. For the two extensions, we …nd that having equity issuance costs has important implications for model dynamics, however, debt-de ‡ation e¤ect (generated by having debt contracts written in nominal terms) is not the dominating e¤ect for the dynamics of net worth. We …nd that variability in in ‡ation under PT is less than under IT. This is because forward-looking agents will adjust prices by to a lesser extent under PT since they expect the monetary authority will o¤set the current shocks in the future. Rational expectations become automatic stabilizers in this forward-looking model. In fact, this expectation channel is so e¤ective and the variability in price level so low that the nominal interest rate is less volatile under PT. As a result, variabilities in the real interest rate and output gap vary little across the two regimes in our benchmark case.
In order to identify the role of …nancial market imperfections in the PT versus IT comparison, we estimate two alternative models: one from which equity market frictions have been removed and one from which frictions in both markets have been removed. As compared against these two models, the data favor our benchmark model. We conduct stochastic simulations based on these three di¤erent models and we show that relative to the models with …nancial market frictions, the model without …nancial market frictions predicts larger reductions in loss function under PT. The intuition behind these results is as follows: in a model where …nancial market frictions are absent, most of the distortions come from ine¢ cient price dispersions caused by nominal rigidities. Thus stabilizing in ‡ation implies a stabilization of the output gap, and PT is particularly e¤ective. However, in the presence of …nancial markets imperfections this is not necessarily the case. The agency costs in the debt market and the equity issuance costs in the equity market create additional distortions. Due to these distortions, stabilizing in ‡ation does not necessarily lead to less variability in the output gap. The e¤ectiveness of PT depends on the shock structure. In particular, following an investment-speci…c shock, these additional distortions cause in ‡ation and the output gap to move in opposite directions. In this case, the monetary authority faces a trade-o¤ between the output gap and in ‡ation: when monetary authority tries to bring down in ‡ation, the output gap widens. Thus, if this type of shock is a signi…cant source of volatility in economy, a decrease in the volatility of in ‡ation might lead to smaller reduction (or even increase) in the volatility of the output gap, thus reducing the e¤ectiveness of PT.
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The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we present the model and in section 3, we discuss the data and estimation strategy. In section 4, we report the estimation results and illustrate the main mechanisms of the model. In section 5, we analyze the PT versus IT using the results from stochastic simulations. Section 6 o¤ers some conclusions.
Model

Households
The representative household derives utility from consumption, C t ; real money balances, M t =P t ; and leisure, 1 H t , with 0 < H < 1. The household owns equity in retailers and supplies labor to entrepreneurs who produce the wholesale goods. The household saves by holding a one-period riskless bond B t . The aggregate price is P t . Preferences are given by
where 1= is the labor supply elasticity, and and ' are the weights on leisure and real money balance in the utility function. The variable e t is an exogenous preference shock which follows log e t = e log e t 1 + e t ; e t i:i:d: N (0;
The representative household is subject to the following budget constraint
where W t is the nominal wage that the household receives from the entrepreneurs, t is the real dividend from retailers, T t is a lump-sum tax, B t 1 is the bond held between periods t 1 and t, and R n t 1 is the nominal rate of return on the riskless bond. The household maximizes its expected lifetime utility equation (1) subject to equation (4). The …rst-order conditions include
and
Entrepreneurs
As in Bernanke et al. (1999) (herein, BGG) entrepreneurs are risk-neutral and manage the production of wholesale goods. The production function for wholesale goods is given by
At the end of period t 1, entrepreneurs purchase capital K j t and use it in period t to produce wholesale goods with labor L j t . Production is subject to two type of shocks: ! t is the idiosyncratic shock, which is private information to the entrepreneur and is i.i.d across entrepreneurs and time, with mean E[! j t ] = 1; z t is an exogenous technology shock common to all the entrepreneurs which follows
Labor consists of both household labor H j t and entrepreneurial labor H ej t :
Given K j t , the demand for both household labor and entrepreneurial labor satisfy the following …rst-order conditions
where W t and W e t are respectively the nominal wages received by households and entrepreneurs, and P W;t is the nominal price of wholesale goods.
Capital purchased at the end of period t, K j t+1 , is partly …nanced from the entrepreneur's net worth, N j t+1 , and partly from issuing nominal debt, B j t :
where Q t is the price of capital relative to the aggregate price P t . Note, unlike in BGG, that the debt contract in this model is in nominal terms, that is, entrepreneurs sign a debt contract that speci…es a nominal interest rate, R n t . The …nancial market imperfections are similar to those in BGG: because the idiosyncratic shock ! j t is private information for the borrowers (entrepreneurs), there exists 7 As in Bernanke et al. (1999) , each entrepreneur is endowed with H e t units of labor to ensure that new entrepreneurs have some funds to start out. information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders (…nancial intermediaries). Due to costly state veri…cation, lenders have to pay an auditing cost to observe the output. In BGG the optimal contract is a standard debt with costly bankruptcy: if the entrepreneur does not default, the lender receives a …xed payment independent of ! j t but contingent upon the aggregate state; if the entrepreneur defaults, the lender audits and seizes the realized return (net of monitoring costs). The risk premium associated with external funds, s(:), is de…ned as the ratio of the entrepreneur's cost of external funds to the cost of internal funds
where
is the expected rate of return of capital, which is equal to the expected cost of external funds in equilibrium, and
] is the cost of internal funds. BGG shows that the optimal contract implies that the external …nance premium, s(:), depends on the entrepreneur's balance sheet position. In particular, the external …nance premium increases with leverage, and thus, can be characterized by the reduced-form function
where s 0 (:) > 0 and s(1) = 1. 8 The supply curve for external …nancing or the expected marginal cost of external …nancing can be obtained by rearranging the terms in equation (13)
The expected gross return on capital from periods t to t + 1, E t R k t+1 , depends on the marginal productivity of capital and the capital gain,
The demand for capital depends on both the expected return on capital (equation (16)) and the expected cost of external …nancing (equation (15)). To ensure that entrepreneurs will never accumulate enough funds to …nance capital acquisitions entirely out of net worth, following BGG, we assume that they have …nite lives. The probability that an entrepreneur survives until the next period is . 8 In estimation, we adopt the following functional form to determine the external …nance premium:
where > 0. In the steady-state, the external …nance premium is determined by equation 13.
The aggregate net worth of entrepreneurs at the end of period t, N t+1 , is the sum of equity held by entrepreneurs surviving from period t 1 and the wage income:
Equation (17) suggests that the di¤erence between the realized rate of return on capital in period t, R k t , and the expected rate of return on capital in the previous period, E t 1 R k t , is the main source of changes in the entrepreneurial net worth. Since entrepreneurs sign a debt contract that speci…es a nominal interest rate in our model, an unanticipated change in in ‡ation will also a¤ect the real cost of debt repayment, and, in turn, the di¤erence between R k t and E t 1 R k t . Substituting equation (15) into equation (17), we get
(18) which implies that an unexpected increase (decrease) in in ‡ation reduces (increases) the real cost of debt repayment and, in turn, increase (decrease) net worth (debt-de ‡ation e¤ect).
Entrepreneurs going out of business will consume their residual equity,
where C e t is the aggregate consumption of the entrepreneurs who exit in period t.
Capital producers
Capital production is assumed to be subject to an investment-speci…c shock, x t . Capital producers purchase the …nal goods from retailers as investment goods, I t , and produce e¢ cient investment goods, x t I t . E¢ cient investment goods are then combined with the existing capital stock to produce new capital goods, K t+1 . The aggregate capital stock evolves according to:
The shock x t follows the …rst-order autoregressive process:
Capital producers are subject to equity issuance costs. Following Covas and den Haan (2006), we let equity issuance costs, (I t ; x t ), vary with the shock x t :
9 Note that the wage income for entrepreneurs is quantitatively small. where
This functional form has two features: (1). the cost of issuing equity is quadratic. (2). equity issuance cost is countercyclical. Feature 1 is motivated by the empirical evidence in Altinkiliç and Hansen (2000) that underwriting fees display increasing marginal costs. Feature 2 is used to capture the following consideration: one thing that makes equity issuance costly is investors'concern that a …rm has an incentive to issue equity when it has private information that it is overvalued by the market. Choe et al. (1993) argues that this concern is countercyclical.
10
Capital producers are also subject to a quadratic capital adjustment cost , 2 (
The pro…t of capital producers is
and the …rst-order condition is
Retailers
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers of measure 1. Retailers buy wholesale goods from entrepreneurs and di¤erentiate them at zero cost. Let Y t (j) be the retail good sold by retailer j and let P t (j) be its nominal price. The …nal good, Y t , is the composite of individual retail goods,
and the corresponding price index, P t , is given by
The demand function faced by each retailer is given by
Following Calvo (1983) , each retailer cannot reoptimize prices unless it receives a random signal. The probability of receiving such a signal is 1 . Thus, in each period, only a fraction of 1 of retailers reset their prices, while the remaining retailers keep their prices unchanged. Given the demand function equation (28), the retailer chooses P jt to 10 See more discussion in Covas and den Haan (2006) maximize its expected real total pro…t over the periods during which its prices remain …xed:
where t;i i C t+i =C t is the stochastic discount factor and the real marginal cost, mc t , is the price of wholesale goods relative to the price of …nal goods (P W;t =P t ). Let P t be the optimal price chosen by all …rms adjusting at time t. The …rst order condition is:
The aggregate price evolves according to:
Aggregation and equilibrium
We assume that the newly created money is transferred to households, so that
The resource constraint for …nal goods is
However, this restriction is not valid in this model. Price stickiness induces price dispersion across …nal goods, and this price dispersion is ine¢ cient and causes output loss. Thus, when aggregating, we need to make some adjustment to take into account this ine¢ ciency. To see this, consider the equilibrium condition at the …rm level:
when integrating over all …rms, we obtain
We can show that
11 See Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006) for details.
Thus, the resource constraint in the model is given by
where t summarizes the resource costs induced by the relative price dispersion. SchmittGrohé and Uribe (2006) show that t is bounded below by 1 and has …rst-order real consequences for the stationary distribution of the endogenous variables if the steadystate in ‡ation is positive.
Monetary policy rules
In ‡ation targeting. Under an in ‡ation targeting regime, we assume that the central bank operates according to the standard Taylor Rule. The central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate, R n t , in response to deviations of in ‡ation, t , from its steady-state value, , and output, Y t , from its e¢ cient level, Y e t , which is de…ned as the level of output that would prevail in the ‡exible-price economy without …nancial market imperfections. 12 We use the deviation from the e¢ cient output level rather than the steady-state level for the following reasons: …rst, in the presence of technology shocks, the e¢ cient level of output varies. It is natural to allow the central bank to recognize this fact when adjusting nominal interest rates. Second, the e¢ cient output level tends to move in the same direction as output. As a result, if the central bank takes deviation from the steady-state output as an argument in its policy rule, it will tend to set policy that is too contractionary to a positive technology shock and too expansionary to a negative technology shock R n t
where R n and are the steady-state values of R n t and t , and " m t is a monetary policy shock which follows "
and Y are policy coe¢ cients chosen by the central bank.
Price-level-path targeting. We assume that by targeting the price level, the central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate, R n t , in response to deviations of the price level, P t , from the targeted price level P t and deviations of the output from its e¢ cient level:
where P t = t P 0 , and P 0 = 1:
Data and Estimation Strategy
We adopt a Bayesian approach to estimate the model. We use four series of quarterly Canadian data: output, investment, nominal interest rate and in ‡ation. These series correspond to the vector of observable variables of our model. The sample for our data set spans from 1980Q1 to 2006Q4. Output is measured by real GDP excluding government expenditures because there is no government spending in the model. 13 Investment is measured by the sum of business gross …xed capital formation and business investment in inventories. The nominal interest rate is measured by the overnight rate. In ‡ation is calculated from the core CPI.
14 Data on output and investment are expressed in per capita terms using the civilian population aged 15 and up. Both output and investment series are linearly detrended before estimation. Since a constant in ‡ation target is not plausible for the sample period of 1980Q1 to 2006Q4, we detrend the in ‡ation and nominal interest rate data using the implicit in ‡ation target series from Amano and Murchison (2000) .
As is standard when taking DSGE models to the data, we set some parameters prior to estimation because they cannot be identi…ed from the data. The discount factor is set at 0:99, which corresponds to an annual real interest rate in the steady-state at four percent. The steady-state depreciation rate is set to 0:025, which implies an annual rate of depreciation of ten percent. The parameter of the Cobb-Douglas function, , is set to 1=3. The steady-state price mark up "=(" 1) is set to 1:1. We set = 0:8 so that the implied labor supply elasticity is 1= = 1:25. We set = 0:195 so that households spend one third of their time working. The survival rate of entrepreneurs, , is set to 0:9728, which is taken from BGG; this implies that the average working life for entrepreneurs is 36 years. The steady-state in ‡ation rate is set to = 0:02 per year.
For the parameters that we estimate, the …rst column in Table 2 gives the density, mean and standard deviation of the priors. The elasticity of the external …nance premium with respect to …rm leverage is set to have a gamma distribution with mean 0:05, which is close to the estimate in Christensen and Dib (2008) , which uses maximum likelihood procedure to estimate a sticky-price model with a …nancial accelerator on U.S. data.
For the equity issuance cost, we adopt the following functional form:
where 0 is set to have a gamma distribution with mean 0:75 and standard deviation of 0.1 and the time-varying parameter, 1 , is set to have a gamma distribution with mean 20 and standard deviation of 2. This implies that at the steady-state the average equity issuance cost is around 5 percent and the standard deviation of equity issuance cost is around 1 percent, which is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Covas and den Haan (2006) .
The rest of the priors are standard and follow the literature. For the monetary policy rule, we set the prior of the reaction on in ‡ation, , to have a gamma distribution with mean 1.5 and standard deviation 0.1. The coe¢ cient of the reaction on output gap, y , is assumed to have a normal distribution of mean 0.1 and standard deviation 0.02.
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For the priors of the shocks a¤ecting the economy, we set the autoregressive coe¢ -cients of the technology shocks, investment e¢ ciency shocks and preference shocks to have a beta distribution with mean 0:80 and standard deviation 0.05. The standard deviations of the innovations are assumed to follow an inverse-gamma distribution with a mean of 0:01.
Finally, following the literature, the parameter , which determines the degree of capital adjustment costs, is set to have a normal distribution with mean 0:25 and standard deviation 0.05. The Calvo probability is assumed to be around 0.67, suggesting an average length of price contract of three quarters.
We use Dynare 3.065 to estimate the model. We use the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm to perform simulations. To check convergence, we run two di¤erence chains starting from dispersed points. For each chain, the total number of draws is 100; 000 and the …rst 20 percent of the draws are neglected. A step size of 0:5 resulted in a rejection rate of 0:36. Table 2 displays the mode, the mean, and the 5 and 95 percentiles of the posterior distribution of the parameters. The prior and posterior distributions of all parameters are shown in Figures 1 and 2 . Figure 3 displays the smoothed shocks. Overall, the data seem to be very informative on the exogenous shock processes and the monetary policy parameters. The data appear to be less informative on behavioral parameters, especially , the capital adjustment cost parameter, and 1 , the parameter determining the volatility of equity issuance costs.
Estimation Results
Parameter estimates
In what follows, we report the posterior modes instead of means since they are very close. The elasticity of the risk premium with respect to leverage, , is estimated to be around 4 percent. The estimated posterior mode of equity issuance cost parameters, 0 and 1 , are 0:92 and 19:64 respectively. This implies that in the steady-state the average equity issuance cost is around 5:2 percent and the standard deviation of the average equity issuance cost is around 1 percent.
The estimated value of monetary policy parameters, , the coe¢ cient which measures the response of monetary policy to deviation of in ‡ation, is 1:3. Given that we set the interest rate smoothing parameter to 0, this value is quite reasonable. The coe¢ cient that measures the response of monetary policy to output gap, y , is 0:015. This suggests that policy does not appear to react very strongly to output gap.
Turning to the estimates of the parameters for the exogenous shock processes, it turns out that both the investment-speci…c shock and preference shock are more persistent (0.88 and 0.87, respectively) than the technology shock (0.76). The preference and technology shocks are more volatile (0.0114 and 0.0147 respectively) than the investmentspeci…c and monetary policy shocks (0.0057 and 0.0067).
Finally, we turn to the other two parameters, and . The estimate of , the capital adjustment cost, is 0:26, which is lower than the estimated value in Christensen and Dib (2008) . This suggests that the frictions in the capital production market is partly being captured by the equity issuance costs. The estimate of the sticky price parameter, , is 0.42, suggesting that the average duration of price contracts is about two quarters.
Model comparison
To further access the impact of modeling explicitly the frictions in the debt market and equity market, we estimate two alternative models: one model with debt market frictions but no equity issuance costs, in which we set 0 = 1 = 0 (DF model, hereafter), and, one model without frictions in either the debt or equity market, in which we set equity issuance costs to be 0, turn o¤ the …nancial accelerator by setting = 0, and set the external risk premium at its steady-state level (NoFF model, hereafter). We compare the log data densities obtained from these models with that of the benchmark model with both debt and equity frictions (EDF model, hereafter). We also compare the model-implied volatilities and correlations of key variables with the data. Table 3 presents the estimates of the modes of the parameters and log data densities for the three models. To facilitate the comparison across the three models, the …rst column reproduces the estimates of the EDF model. Based on log data density, we conclude that the data prefers the EDF model. Table 4 compares the standard deviations and relative volatilities of key variables implied in each model against the data. Although all of the three models generate higher relative volatilities in investment, nominal interest rate and in ‡ation than is observed empirically, the results from the EDF model are closer to the data. Table 5 reports correlations between variables from the data and for the three models. The EDF model generates a correlation between nominal interest rate and in ‡ation that is very close to the data, although it predicts lower correlations between the other variables. The DF model generates higher values for all the correlations except that between output and investment. The results for the NoFF model are similar to the DF model except that it underpredicts the correlations between output and the nominal interest rate and between output and in ‡ation.
Impulse responses
In order to examine the e¤ect of the imperfections in the debt and equity markets on model dynamics, we simulate the three economies EDF, DF and NoFF. 16 Figures 4 through 7 show the impulse responses to one standard deviation of investment-speci…c shock, technology shock, preference shock and monetary policy shock. Each variable's response is expressed as a percentage deviation from its steady-state level. Because we assume that monetary policy reacts to the deviation of output from the e¢ cient output level, we plot responses in both output and the output gap. Figure 4 shows the impulse responses to a one standard deviation of investment-e¢ ciency shock. In response to the shock, …nal goods are now turned into investment goods more e¢ ciently. As a result, investment increases and the price of capital falls. Since households spend more resources on investment, consumption decreases. To smooth ‡uctuations in consumption households increase the supply of labor. Thus hours increase and output rises. In ‡ation and nominal interest rate rise on impact.
Investment-e¢ ciency shock
Responses in the DF Model are "dampened" relative to the responses of the model without …nancial market frictions (the NoFF Model). Output, investment and hours still increase, but to a lesser degree. This is due to imperfections in the debt market. The decrease in asset price drives down net worth, which causes the external risk premium to rise. This dampens the response in investment, consumption, hours and output. Notice that net worth falls despite an increase in in ‡ation. This indicates that the debt de ‡ation e¤ect is not dominant. Output falls below its potential due to the imperfections in the …nancial market.
In the model with both nominal debt and equity issuance costs (the EDF model), although the dampening e¤ect of the …nancial accelerator still exists, output, investment and hours increases to a greater extent than in DF. This is due to the countercyclical nature of equity issuance costs. After a positive investment-speci…c shock, the issuance cost per unit of equity decreases, and capital producers increase capital production in response to this reduced cost. As a result, investment rises more and the asset price decreases much more. Households need to reduce consumption even more in order to increase investment spending. However, households are not willing to reduce consumption too much, thus in order to smooth consumption, households increase labor supply, which leads to an increase in output. Thus, on impact, we observe a positive output gap, and the overall deviation of output from its e¢ cient level is less than in the DF model. Figure 5 presents the impulse responses to a one standard deviation of a technology shock. In the model without …nancial market frictions, output, investment, consumption and hours rise. Asset prices rise due to increased demand for capital. Both in ‡ation and the nominal interest rate fall.
Technology shock
The DF Model shows that the …nancial accelerator dampens the responses of output, investment and asset prices slightly. This is due to the rise in external risk premium.
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Net worth increases despite the fact that in ‡ation declines. This indicates again that the debt-de ‡ation e¤ect is not the e¤ect dominating the dynamics of net worth. In the model with equity issuance costs (the EDF model), there is more dampening in output and investment. Capital producers need to …nance the increase in investment with costly equity; this additional cost pushes up the asset price and dampens the response in investment. In contrast to the investment-speci…c shock, the issuance cost per unit of equity has not changed. Overall, the distortions generated by the imperfections in the debt market and equity issuance market force output below the potential level. The distortions are more severe in the EDF model.
Preference shock
The impulse responses to a one standard deviation of a preference shock are plotted in Figure 6 . Following the shock, the marginal utility of consumption increases, which drives up the opportunity cost of savings. Households divert wealth saved in deposits to consumption. The decline in savings leads the nominal interest rate to increase and investment to fall. The increase in consumption leads households to reduce leisure so hours worked increase. Output rises due to the increase in hours. Asset prices decrease due to the fall in investment.
The impulse responses to a positive preference shock are almost identical in the DF Model and the EDF model except for the response of asset prices. 18 Compared to the NoFF model, in both the DF Model and the EDF model, the presence of the …nancial accelerator dampens the decline in investment due to the decline in the external risk premium. However, the adjustment in investment is smoother in the model with equity since the equity issuance costs increase with investment. This reduces the deviation of output from its e¢ cient level.
Monetary policy shock Finally, …gure 7 plots the impulse responses to one standard deviation of monetary policy shock. After a contractionary monetary policy shock, the nominal interest rate rises. Output, investment, consumption, in ‡ation and the supply of labor all fall on impact. The decrease in investment leads to a decline in the demand for capital, which leads to a lower asset price. Although the …nancial accelerator has a slight ampli…cation e¤ect, the responses in output, consumption and investment are almost identical in the DF Model and the NoFF model. This is because the external risk premium barely changes in the DF model. 19 In the model with both debt and equity frictions, net worth drops much more, leading to a higher risk premium. However, the increase in risk premium is modest and the equity cost e¤ect dominates the response of investment. That is, investment declines less than in the DF model because the cost of issuing equity decreases as investment falls. The declines in hours and output are also dampened.
To summarize, we …nd that the …nancial accelerator ampli…es and propagates the e¤ects of demand shocks (preference and monetary policy shocks) on investment and output, but dampens those of the supply shocks (technology and investment-speci…c shocks). 20 These …ndings are similar to those in Christensen and Dib (2008) which also study the role of the …nancial accelerator mechanism with a nominal debt contract. However, regarding whether the dampening e¤ect of the …nancial accelerator to the supply shocks is caused by debt-de ‡ation e¤ect, our model tells a di¤erent story. In Christensen and Dib (2008) , after a positive technology shock, the decline in in ‡ation increases the real cost of repaying existing debt, creating a debt-de ‡ation e¤ect. This debt-de ‡ation e¤ect dominates and forces net worth down. In our model, net worth increases. This is because after a positive technology shock, the rate of return on capital increases so much that it dominates debt-de ‡ation e¤ect and drives up net worth.
Overall, we show that the movement of the external risk premium is the driving force determining whether the …nancial accelerator has a ampli…cation or a dampening e¤ect. Following a positive supply shock, this …nancial accelerator mechanism leads to a negative output gap due to the dampening e¤ect. Following a positive demand shock, it leads to a positive output gap due to the ampli…cation e¤ect.
21 Equity issuance costs add another distortion to capital production, making capital adjustment more costly to all shocks except the investment-speci…c shock. Following demand shocks, this additional distortion dampens the response in investment, which helps to close the positive output gap. For the remaining supply shocks, technology shock and investment-speci…c shock, the e¤ects of this distortion are di¤erent. Following a positive technology shock, this additional distortion drives output further below the potential. However, following an investment-speci…c shock, the countercyclical feature of equity issuance costs mitigates the dampening in investment. On impact we observe a positive output gap, and overall deviation of output from the e¢ cient level is less than in the model with only debt market frictions.
Price-level versus in ‡ation targeting
How would the real variables in the economy with …nancial market imperfections respond to the shocks in a price-level path targeting regime? Can a price-level targeting regime outperform the current in ‡ation targeting regime in an economy with …nancial market imperfections? To answer these questions, in this section, we conduct stochastic simulations comparing these two regimes.
PT versus IT with …nancial market imperfections: the benchmark case
In the simulations, we assume that the only di¤erence in the two economies is monetary policy: in one case the central bank follows an in ‡ation targeting rule, while the other follows a price-level path rule. The behavioral parameters and the parameters governing the exogenous shocks do not vary between these two regimes; their values are taken from Table 2 . 22 For the coe¢ cients in the in ‡ation targeting rule, and y , we set them to the estimates = 1:30 and y = 0:015. We do not have much knowledge of the values of the coe¢ cients in the price-level path rule. Instead of identifying an optimal PT rule, which requires a utility-based welfare analysis, we provide a numerical example that sheds some light on how e¤ective PT is in reducing the variability in output gap and in ‡ation given the distortions in …nancial markets. In this example, we set p = 1:30 and y = 0:015, take it as our benchmark. In the next section, we varies these parameters to examine di¤erent PT rules. To evaluate these two rules, in Table 6 we report the standard deviations of key variables and the loss functions under the two rules, which are based on the weighted average of the variance of output gap and the variance of in ‡ation:
ss . Since one of the natural questions arising with a price-level targeting regime is how long it should take for price level to return to target, we also report this horizon. 24 We report the long-run forecast-error variance decompositions for output gap, in ‡ation and nominal interest rate for both regimes in Table 7 . Table 6 shows that compared to the economy under the IT rule, the economy under the PT rule has much less variability in in ‡ation (36 percent of that under the IT rule) and slightly less variability in output gap (98 percent of that under the IT rule). The variability in price level under the PT rule is also very small, which explains the lower variability in the nominal interest rate. Overall, this PT rule reduces loss by 21 percent, and brings the price level back to target in 4 years.
Thus, for the benchmark case, PT can be a free lunch: in ‡ation variability is not only reduced in the long-run but also in the short-run. This con…rms the new view that in a forward-looking model, under PT in ‡ation expectations operate as automatic stabilizers. Forward-looking agents understand that the central bank will o¤set disturbances to the price level and take this into account when they set today's prices, thus it is optimal for them to change prices by less. This also explains why real shocks (technology, investment 22 The parameters of the model might not be invariant to the monetary policy rule. However, it is not obvious which of the parameters are likely to change and in which direction. Regarding uncertainty and monetary policy, see interesting discussions in Dib et al. (2008) 23 The loss function can be represented in a more general form, L = var( \ Y gap t ) + var( t ss ) with 0 < < 1. We consider this equal weight loss function as the upper bound. The results of the PT-IT comparison can vary if we rank rules based welfare considerations rather than loss functions. 24 Horizon is de…ned and computed in the following way. First, we plot the impulse response functions of the price level for each shock and compute the number of periods that it takes for the price level to return to the steady state. More speci…cally, we use the " 90 percent rule" to determine whether the steady-state has been reached. That is, once the price level recovers 90 percent from the peak of the deviation, we suppose that it has come back to the steady-state. Then we weigh each of the responses to come up with an aggregate response. For the weights, we use the contributions of the shocks to the variability of price level and normalize them to 1. Note that another way of computing horizon is to use the stochastic simulation method of Basant Roi and Mendes (2007) and preference shocks) contribute little to variability in in ‡ation and nominal interest rate under the PT rule.
However, given that there is not much stickiness in this economy (the estimated Calvo parameter is only 0:42) and that debt-de ‡ation e¤ect is not the dominating e¤ect for the dynamics of net worth, the reduction in in ‡ation variability has little impact on output gap variability. In fact, the changes in the nominal interest rate and in ‡ation cancel out each other and leave the variability of real interest rate barely changed between the two regimes. The variance decompositions of output gap under the two regimes are also quite similar.
The role of …nancial market imperfections in PT versus IT comparison
Simulation results based on the benchmark model suggest that frictions in the debt and the equity markets have important e¤ects on the dynamics of the model. Thus, policy recommendations based on di¤erent models (modeling frictions explicitly or ignoring the frictions) can potentially be di¤erent. In order to examine the policy question, we conduct the following experiments in this section: …rst, we compute variability in in ‡ation and output gap for the EDF, DF and NoFF economies using the parameter values and monetary policy rules estimated separately for each economy in sections 4.1 and 4.2. Then, we assume that the three economies are subject to the same PT rule. We conduct stochastic simulations under di¤erent combinations of the parameters y and p . Tables 8 through 10 We …rst focus on the common pattern. We observe in all the three models when the monetary authority responds to output gap very weakly, there is no trade-o¤ between variability in output gap and in ‡ation. That is, given low y , when the monetary authority responds more aggressively to price-level, both in ‡ation and output gap becomes less volatile. However, when the monetary authority responds to output gap very aggressively ( y =1 and y =5), a trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output gap starts to appear. Notice that horizon becomes substantivally longer in these cases since the monetary authority puts more weight on stabilizing output gap relative to price level. 25 PT delivers lower variability in in ‡ation and smaller loss for most of the cases.
We now turn to the di¤erences. The simulation results suggest that in general given the same PT rule, compared to the model EDF, the model ignoring both debt market imperfections and equity market imperfections predicts greater reductions in both variability in output gap and in ‡ation, while the model ignoring equity issuance frictions predicts lower reductions in both. Both the DF model and the NoFF model predict shorter horizons.
The intuition behind these results is as follows. In the NoFF model, most of the distortions come from the nominal rigidity in prices, that is, most of the variability in output gap is caused by ine¢ cient price dispersion. In this model, reduction of in ‡ation variability would automatically reduce output gap variability, so PT is most e¤ective. In the models with …nancial market imperfections, the agency costs in the debt market and the equity issuance costs in the equity market create additional distortions. Due to the existence of these real frictions, reducing in ‡ation variability does not necessarily lead to less variability in the output gap. The e¤ectiveness of PT depends on the shock structure. For the shocks that drive in ‡ation and output gap in the same direction, a monetary policy aimed at stabilizing in ‡ation can still stabilize output gap. However, for the shocks that lead in ‡ation and output gap to move in the opposite directions, the monetary authority faces a trade-o¤ between output gap and in ‡ation: when monetary authority tries to bring down in ‡ation, the output gap widens. A positive investment-speci…c shock is an example of the latter type. Following a positive investment-speci…c shock, in the DF model, we observe a negative output gap and a rise in in ‡ation. Frictions in the debt market prevent investment from rising as much as in the NoFF model, which causes output to fall below the potential. In the EDF model, following an investment-speci…c shock, the countercyclical feature of equity issuance costs mitigates the distortions generated in the debt market, and therefore output deviates from the e¢ cient level to a lesser extent than in the DF model. Thus PT is more e¤ective in the EDF model. These results suggest that the conclusions regarding the advantages of the PT regime versus the IT regime are dependent on the type of frictions/shocks being considered.
Conclusions
The objective of this paper is to compare the performance of two monetary policy regimes-price-level-path targeting and in ‡ation targeting-in a standard New Keynesian model augmented with …nancial market imperfections. We …nd that introducing …nancial market imperfections brings new and important insights to the evaluation of these two monetary policy regimes.
Speci…cally, the contributions of the paper are as follows: …rst, we show that modeling …nancial market frictions, especially equity market frictions, enhances the model's …t to Canadian data, and that …nancial market frictions have important implications for model dynamics. Second, compared to the current IT regime, we show that PT can be a free lunch-that is, in ‡ation variability is reduced not only in the long-run but also in the short-run. Third, we show that PT is most e¤ective in reducing the distortions caused by nominal rigidities. Fourth, we show that given the existence of …nancial market frictions, the model ignoring those frictions can give misleading predictions regarding the gains (or the losses) arising from a switch to PT There are several directions in which this paper could be extended. First, to better evaluate the performance of PT versus IT, a utility-based welfare analysis will be necessary. Second, given that we focus on the Canadian economy, a small open economy model could potentially …t the data better. 26 Third, the fact that the debt-de ‡ation e¤ect is not signi…cant may be due to the nominal debt contract only lasting one-period in our model. With longer contracts, we expect that di¤erent implications for the PT-IT comparison could emerge. 
